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Abstract
We consider the endogenous choice of a voting rule, characterized by the majority
size needed to elect change over the status quo, by a society who will use the rule to
make future decisions. Under simple assumptions on the uncertainty concerning the
future alternatives that will be voted upon, voters' have induced preferences over voting
rules that are single-peaked and intermediate. We explore the existence of self-stable
voting rules, i.e., voting rules such that there is no alternative rule that would beat the
given voting rule if the given voting rule is used to choose between the rules. There
are situations where self-stable voting rules do not exist. We explore conditions that
guarantee existence, as well as issues relating to eÆciency and constitutional design.
JEL classication numbers: D71, D72
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1 Introduction
Dierent societies use dierent voting rules to make collective decisions. How do they
come to choose the voting rule that will guide their subsequent decision making? Should
the choice of a choice rule be treated as a special type of decision, or is it just one more
instance of the many issues that a society has to face? If the choice of voting rule deserves
a special treatment, what are the grounds for it, and what type of considerations are to
be added to those already incorporated into the rules for day-to-day decisions? These
are the questions we address in this paper. Let us expand on their relevance, outline our
approach and some of our results.
The voting rule that a society uses to make collective decisions has consequences.
For instance, a society that uses simple majority might reach a dierent decision than
if it required two thirds of the voters to approve change over status quo for a proposed
change to be accepted. The extensive social choice literature has analyzed the properties
of many voting rules, and it is well understood that the rules to be used make a dierence
as soon as society members have conicting interests.
Taking for granted that voting rules matter, the question arises as to who chooses the
rules of choice, and on what grounds. We consider here that the members of society vote
over voting rules. This is the case in many situations where democratic institutions are
in place: they include procedures for constitutional changes.
1
There are many important
questions that come to mind and we focus on several of them:
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Even when citizens are not actually allowed to change the rules, understanding whether or not they
would like to change them, and in what direction, is a relevant standard of evaluation.
 When do self-stable voting rules exist - that is, are there rules such that if such a
rule is used, then no other rule would defeat it?
 What sorts of constitutions (specifying one voting rule for standard decisions and
a dierent voting rule for voting over constitutions) are self-stable?
 When is simple majority rule (which is attractive for its eÆciency) self-stable and
when can it be included in a self-stable constitution?
To give more perspective to these questions, let us describe the model in which we
answer them. To explore voting over voting rules, we need to study a context in which
preferences over voting rules and votes over voting rules can be naturally considered.
We do this by taking the following perspective. Two alternatives are to be voted upon
in in the future, and perhaps a number of such choices will be faced. In each instance,
one of these alternatives will be the status quo and the other will be some change. A
voting rule is simply characterized by the minimal number of votes required in favor
of change in order to select change. Each voter is characterized by a probability that
they will support the status quo. To x ideas, think of a legislature just beginning a
term. Legislators know that they will face votes on bills which would introduce changes
to current systems. Some legislators might be very satised with the current system
and thus expect to favor a relatively low percentage of the bills that will be voted upon.
These legislators would have a relatively high probability of supporting the status quo
and a low probability of supporting change. They would end up preferring voting rules
that make change diÆcult.
2
Other legislators might be very dissatised with the current
system and thus expect to favor a high percentage of the bills that will be faced. These
legislators would have a relatively low probability of supporting the status quo and a
high probability of supporting change. They would end up preferring voting rules that
make change easy.
3
Voters' beliefs over their relative likelihood of supporting change
versus the status quo induces preferences over voting rules. We examine these indirect
preferences over voting rules in some detail, and it turns out that this very simple model
of uncertainty ends up producing a remarkable structure to preferences over voting rules,
as discussed in the sections that follow.
While the discussion of the uncertain preferences above is a bit abstract, it is clear that
there are many decisions which t exactly into this framework. For instance, examples
include voting over whether to admit new members to a club or organization (or to grant
tenure), or a vote by a parliament or legislature on whether or not to go to war, a vote
2
The term \relatively" is used in this discussion for a reason. As we will see below, the preferences
over voting rules will depend on the relative comparisons of various voters' probabilities of supporting
change, and cannot simply be determined by the absolute probabilities. For instance, even if a voter
has a low probability of supporting change; if that probability is much higher than any other voter's
probability, then that voter will be the most likely to be among the supporters of a change whenever
change is supported. This would mean that the voter should favor voting rules that make change easy,
even though their absolute probability of supporting change is low.
3
For much more discussion of and motivation for this model of a choice over two alternatives that
are currently uncertain in voters' minds, see the introductory chapter in Niemi and Weisberg (1972), as
well as the chapters by Badger (1972), Curtis (1972), and Schoeld (1972).
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by shareholders of a company on whether to approve a plan proposed by their board,
etc.. Nevertheless, an important consideration that this model abstracts away is agenda
formation. As agendas can be endogenous, agenda formation may interact with the voting
rule in interesting ways. In our analysis here, we ignore where the agenda comes from
with the understanding that analyzing voting over voting rules with exogenous agendas
is a useful rst step, there are important situations where agendas are naturally viewed
as exogenous to the voters, and expanding the model to account for endogenous agendas
provides for interesting further research.
Knowing how the members in our stylized society have induced preferences over dif-
ferent voting rules, we can ask which rules are likely to be chosen, or more specically,
which rules are likely to persist. Given some voting rule in place, by imposition or by a
previous act of choice, would this rule prevail against others, when the rule itself is used
to determine whether to keep it as the status quo, or change it for some of its potential
contenders? Since we concentrate on the choice among majoritarian rules, our problem is
that of choosing the majority size required to change the status quo. Then, our previous
question can be rephrased as follows. Given a majority size s, will it be the case that no
alternative majority size s
0
is preferred over s by s or more voters? If s is not so defeated
by any other rule, we say that the rule s is self-stable.
We argue that self-stability is a desirable property of voting rules. If a society uses
a rule that is not self-stable, then there will be a large enough group of voters who all
prefer some alternative voting rule to be successful in changing the rule. Hence, societies
which value the type of stability embodied in the continued use of the same rules of the
game, should settle for voting rules which are self-stable, when available. Also, one may
argue that self-stable voting rules are the ones that should emerge over time, as rules
that are not self-stable will be transient while voting rules that are self-stable will be
absorbing states.
Since self-stability is a property that depends on the preferences of voters regarding
alternative voting methods, dierent rules will be self-stable depending on the type of
society. We thus provide a careful study of the variables that determine which rules are
self-stable. As we shall see, for some societies no voting rule is self-stable. Moreover, our
analysis makes it apparent that this lack of self-stability is a robust phenomenon, not an
occasional anomaly. However, as we show, the non-existence problem occurs in less than
1/2 of all potential societies, in a well-dened sense.
If some societies do not have the possibility of choosing any voting rule that is self-
stable, does this mean that they are doomed to an endless and hopeless drift from an
unstable rule to another unstable one? Certainly not. If this was the end of our story,
we might well have discovered an imaginary diÆculty, since we do not often observe
a continual change of rules within societies which resort to voting as a means to solve
conict. But notice that, in actual constitutions, special rules are often set in order to
change the rules of choice. Our discovery that societies may face situations where no
single rule would be self-stable suggests an explanation for this fact. If the choice of only
3
one rule for decisions of any type may be a source of instability, then it is natural to set
at least two rules: one to be used when making standard choices, and a dierent one to
use when it comes to change the preceding rule.
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Consider, then, a stylized constitution, given by two rules (s; S). The rst rule, s, is
used for all decisions except decisions over voting rules. The second rule, S, is used to
make any decisions over the constitution, and in particular is used to make any change
of s. For example, in many real situations s is simple majority (one half of the voters)
and S is two thirds, so a super-majority is needed to change the rules. We say that
a constitution (s; S) is self-stable if no voting rule s
0
would gather the support of S or
more voters when compared to s. Hence, a constitution is self-stable if its rule s to make
standard decisions cannot be challenged eectively under the prescribed procedure for
constitutional changes. There are always self-stable constitutions for any society, as we
shall show.
We explore also explore which super-majorities S are such that the (simple majority,
S) constitution is self-stable. This is an attractive type of constitution because of the
eÆciency of simple majority rule.
Our research takes the view that `choosing how to choose' is an issue that calls
for the treatment of institutions as endogenous variables, and not as exogenously given
data. Thus, we see it as part of a broad and ambitious research program of not only
understanding normative or positive properties of institutions and mechanisms, but also
how they come to take certain forms when individuals in the society have personal stakes
in the design of the institution and can aect it. To some extent this presents a `chicken
and egg' dilemma, as the existing institutional environment to a large extent determines
what institutional changes can take place, and are also the result of previous institutional
change. Economics has a tradition of dealing with problems of this kind by resorting to
appropriate xed-point notions, and self-stability can viewed in this light.
The Related Literature
Since we concentrate on the forces that drive the choice among dierent majority sizes,
we are naturally led to identify those instances where simple majority would arise as the
choice of society. There are many angles from which one can provide theoretical reasons
to support and explain the widespread use of simple majority, and its appeal as a reference
point even when it is not actually used (e.g. see Schoeld (1972)). One is axiomatic:
simple majority is the unique rule to satisfy some combinations of attractive desiderata,
as shown in May's Theorem (1952). Another classical justication is referred to as the
Condorcet jury theorem: the simple majority winner is the maximum likelihood estimator
4
We do not claim that the lack of self-stability is the only relevant reason to establish special rules for
constitutional change. Other classical explanations may concur. For example, if existing constitutions
are viewed as the result of some accumulated wisdom, requiring a large majority to change it may also
be interpreted as a precaution against a short sighted rejection of past experience. What we claim is
that self-stability is a relevant consideration as well, and one that has not been put forth before.
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of the correct decision, in societies where all voters have the common aim of choosing
the alternative that is correct, but dier in their perceptions due to noisy information
(e.g., see Condorcet (1785), or Young and Levenglick (1978)). Our approach diers from
the axiomatic, because we treat the decision rules as choice variables, and from the jury
theorem approach because our voters may have conicting objectives. In fact, the model
we work with was rst proposed in the early seventies in a series of brilliant papers (most
of which are collected in a volume edited by Niemi and Weisberg (1972)), inspired by
a seminal work of Rae (1969), whose purpose was to justify the use of simple majority
from a novel viewpoint. Our analysis reinforces the conclusions of this early literature, by
pointing at new arguments and situations under which simple majority would be the only
self-stable rule. Moreover, the special nature of simple majority is also reinforced by the
fact that it is the only rule for day-to day decisions which constitutes, when coupled with
unanimity, a self-stable constitution valid for all societies. This and other side results
make it clear that simple majority is special in many ways. Yet, our analysis also claries
that alternative majority sizes may have their own advantages, and in particular may be
self-stable for societies where simple majority would not satisfy this desirable property.
Constitutional design and properties of voting rules are topics that have been exten-
sively studied in political science and social choice theory. Such studies go back to the
classics, such as Rousseau (1762) who explicitly discussed how the size of a majority
required in a voting rule should be related to the importance of the question at hand.
5
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) were the rst to raise the issue of choosing how to choose,
and they raise it explicitly in the context of constitutional design. To quote from their
work (page 6):
\When we recognize that \constitutional" decisions themselves, which are necessarily
collective, may also be reached under any of several decision-making rules, the same
issue is confronted all over again. Moreover, in postulating a decision making rule for
constitutional choices, we face the same problem when we ask: How is the rule itself
chosen?"
While Buchanan and Tullock raise the issue of choosing how to choose, they end up
stepping around it and instead focussing on the role of full consent in decision making,
including decisions regarding constitutional choice. This holds with their central thesis
that full consent is the only manner in which proper improvements can be reached due to
the external costs that will be forced on individuals through other decision making rules
such as simple majority rule. In contrast, the approach that we take here of identifying
self-stable voting rules and constitutions, addresses this problem of choosing voting rules
and constitutions head-on. Our central purpose is to analyze such questions of choosing
how to choose and to provide a framework where a fuller understanding of such choices
can be developed.
5
Some recent references from the large literature that relates to issues regarding majority size includes
Caplin and Nalebu (1988), Austen-Smith and Banks (1997), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), and
Dasgupta and Maskin (1998).
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While such exploration of voting over voting rules is relatively new, there is a predeces-
sor to our paper. The rst work that is concerned with carefully modeling how societies
choose how they will choose is Koray (2000). Koray outlines a method for viewing social
choice functions themselves as alternatives, so that one can ask whether a social choice
function always selects itself.
6
He shows that given enough richness of preferences the
only self-selective social choice functions are dictatorial. While our self-stability notion
is similar in spirit to self-selection, there are dierences in the concepts and settings so
that such impossibility results are not an issue in our analysis. First, our concept of self-
stability only requires that a voting rule should not be beaten by another rule when the
given rule is used, which is dierent from saying that a rule must select itself. Another
way to say this is that in our setting there is a special standing to the status-quo alter-
native, which can provide an asymmetry not present in the more abstract social choice
setting analyzed by Koray. Second, the underlying setting here considers votes over two
(possibly uncertain) alternatives at a time, rather than making selections from three or
more (known) alternatives. These dierences reect very dierent idealized applications,
and end up providing dramatic dierences in the model and the results, so that the only
real tie between our study and Koray's is in the common interest of endogenizing the
way in which societies make choices.
There are previous studies of votes to be taken over pairs of alternatives that are still
unknown, but over which voters have beliefs about which they will prefer. In particular,
Rae (1969) conjectured that in such settings simple majority rule was the one that would
maximize total societal welfare, and argued this through some examples. The properties
of simple majority rule were more extensively modeled and veried by Badger (1972) and
Curtis (1972). In doing this, Badger and Curtis studied properties of preferences over
voting rules that are useful in our study here and are noted below as Theorem 1. While
the Badger and Curtis papers provide some useful tools and a nice point of departure for
our analysis, they are not concerned with self-stability of voting rules.
2 Denitions
Voters and Alternatives
N = f1; : : : ; ng is a set of voters.
The voters will face votes over pairs alternatives. We denote the terms of these
pairwise choices as a and b. Alternative a is interpreted as the status-quo. Alternative b
is interpreted as a change.
Voting Rules
6
Koray's results are extended to social choice correspondences and studied further in Koray and
(2000ab).
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Each voter casts a vote in fa; bg.
A voting rule is characterized by a number s 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
7
If at least s voters say
\b" then b is elected, and a is elected otherwise.
Some examples of voting rules are as follows.
If s = 1, then b is elected whenever there is at least one voter for change, and so a is
elected only when it is unanimously supported.
If s = n, then b is elected if there is unanimous support for change, and a is elected
as soon as at least one a voter supports it.
If n is odd and s =
n+1
2
or n is even and s =
n
2
+1, then the voting rule is the standard
or simple majority rule.
8
As simple majority rule is referred to at several points in what follows we denote it
by s
maj
. Thus, s
maj
=
n+1
2
if n is odd and s
maj
=
n
2
+ 1 if n is even.
Note that our denition of a voting rule presumes anonymity. We discuss this property
in the concluding remarks.
Voter Preferences
At the time a voting rule s is chosen, voters have expectations over the future issues
that will be voted on, but do not know the exact realization. We consider a stark model
where voters are simply characterized by a parameter p
i
2 (0; 1). This represents the
probability that they will prefer b to a at the time of the vote.
9
Such an uncertain setting
was rst considered in Badger (1972) and Curtis (1972), and we will make use of some
of their results in what follows.
The realizations of voters' support for the alternatives are independent. For instance,
the probability that voters 1 and 2 support b while voter 3 supports a is p
1
p
2
(1  p
3
).
A voter gets utility 1 if his preferred alternative is chosen in the vote, and utility 0
otherwise.
10
7
Allowing for s = 0 or s = n + 1 results in degenerate voting rules that always choose b or always
choose a, respectively. We focus on rules where there is a real choice to be made.
8
When n is even, there are two possible choices:
n
2
and
n
2
+ 1 depending on which alternative wins
in the case of a tie. For simplicity, we break ties in favor of the status quo in this case. None of the
analysis that follows is dependent on tie-breaking conventions.
9
Extensions to the case where p
i
can be 0 or 1 are straightforward. These cases complicate some of
the calculations and proofs when we divide by p
i
or 1  p
i
, but are still easily directly handled as special
cases. To keep an uncluttered exposition, we leave the cases where p
i
= 0 or 1 to the interested reader.
10
This presumes that a voter cares as much for getting change when preferring change over the status
quo, as the voter cares for preserving the status-quo when preferring the status quo over change. We
discuss the role of this assumption in detail in the concluding remarks.
7
The society of voters is represented by a set of voters N and a vector p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
n
).
In what follows, we treat the society (N; p) as given and so will often suppress the fact
that preferences will depend on these parameters, except where we want to specically
point out this dependence.
As we shall see, the simple identication of a voter with the probability that he or
she will support change rather than the status quo is suÆcient to induce signicant
structure on voters' preferences over voting rules. The probability attached to each voter
may be justied in several ways. For example, suppose that each voter has well dened
preferences over alternative decisions. If the voter knows the existing social situation at
a point in time and also has an idea of the kind of changes that may be proposed, then
the voter may have an estimate of how often he or she will be facing a desired change,
and how often it would rather see the status quo being maintained.
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Induced Preferences over Voting Rules
The simple structure described above induces preferences over voting rules for every
voter. That is, given that voters have beliefs about the likelihood of dierent patterns of
support for a and b, a voter can calculate his or her expected utility under each voting
rule s.
Let U
i
(s) be the expected utility of voter i if voting rule s is used. This is expressed
as follows. For any k 2 f0; : : : ; n  1g, let P
i
(k) denote the probability that exactly k of
the individuals in N n fig support the change. given p. We can write
P
i
(k) =
X
CNnfig:jCj=k

j2C
p
j

`=2C
(1  p
`
): (1)
and
U
i
(s) = p
i
n 1
X
k=s 1
P
i
(k) + (1  p
i
)
s 1
X
k=0
P
i
(k): (2)
Self-Stable Voting Rules
Given that voters' have induced preferences over voting rules, we also study how
voters would vote when voting over voting rules. Our particular interest is in voting
11
Governments, of course, change and the status quo will evolve over time and hence so will voters'
preferences. In this stark model, the probability to favor change that characterizes our stylized voters
summarizes a lot of information about preferences, expectations about the likely proposals they will
face, expectations about the probability that governments (committees, legislatures, etc.) change ,and
expectations regarding how the status quo may evolve. This summary information will also reect
the time horizon for which all these expectations are taken to be relevant. We understand that richer
conclusions may be reached by more explicit models, but we emphasize here that the simplicity of this
summary representation provides substantial insight into the issue of stability of voting rules.
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rules that are robust in the sense that if they are used, then no other voting rule could
be put forth as a challenger and defeat the given voting rule viewed as the status quo.
A voting rule s is self-stable (for society p) if #fi j U
i
(s
0
) > U
i
(s)g < s for every
s
0
6= s.
The property of self-stability ensures that a given voting rule would be robust to
change if used for making decisions.
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3 Properties of Preferences over Voting Rules
Before examining the issue of the existence of self-stable voting rules, we establish some
properties of voters' preferences over voting rules that will be instrumental in under-
standing self-stability.
Single Peaked Preferences
The usual denition of single-peaked preferences requires that all alternatives can be
ranked from left to right, that one alternative
b
s is best, and that the alternatives that
one encounters by moving leftward (or rightward) away from
b
s are considered worse and
worse. Our denition here will be slightly weaker, as it allows a voter to have two peaks.
13
In particular, it is possible that U
i
(
b
s) = U
i
(
b
s  1). For instance, in a society where n is
even and each p
i
= p for all i, all individuals will be indierent between n=2 and n=2+1.
U
i
is single-peaked if there exists
b
s 2 f1; : : : ; ng with U
i
(
b
s)  U
i
(s) for all s 2
f1; : : : ; ng such that U
i
(s) > U
i
(s   1) for any
b
s > s > 1 and U
i
(s   1) > U
i
(s) for any
n  s >
b
s.
Let
b
s
i
denote the peak of voter i.
In the case where a voter has twin-peaks, the denition above selects the higher of
the two peaks as
b
s
i
. This is simply a convention and does not matter in any of the results
that follow.
The following theorem is proven in Badger (1972). We include a proof in the appendix,
for completeness.
12
As with many equilibrium concepts, we do not model how one might reach a self-stable voting rule,
nor do we model the choice among them if there are several. What we can say is that a self-stable rule
would stay in place if reached, while other rules would tend not to.
13
These could be referred to as single-plateaued preferences following the literature. However, given
that such indierence can only occur between two points and happens non-generically (in p) we stick
with the term single-peaked.
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Theorem 1 [Badger (1972)] For any society, every voter's preferences over voting rules
are single-peaked.
Intermediate Preferences and Single Crossing
While Theorem 1 tells us that each voter's preferences over voting rules have the nice
property of single-peakedness, the following theorem tells us about how dierent voters'
preferences are related to each other. There are two properties that are useful in noting.
A society of voters has preferences satisfying the single crossing property if for any i
and j with p
j
 p
i
,
U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
)  U
j
(s)  U
j
(s
0
)
for all s  s
0
.
As we shall see, the single crossing property is satised in this model. The single
crossing property allows us to order preferences over voting rules in terms of the p
i
's; but
more importantly also implies that the preferences are intermediate.
A society of voters has intermediate preferences if for any i, j, k with p
j
 p
k
 p
i
:
 U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
) and U
j
(s)  U
j
(s
0
) imply that U
k
(s)  U
k
(s
0
), and
 U
i
(s) > U
i
(s
0
) and U
j
(s) > U
j
(s
0
) imply that U
k
(s) > U
k
(s
0
).
Intermediate preferences are usually dened by requiring that there exists some or-
dering over individuals so that when two individuals have the same ranking over two
alternatives, then individuals between them in the ordering have that same ranking (e.g.,
see Grandmont (1978)). Here the natural ordering over individuals is in terms of their
p
i
's, the distinguishing characteristic of voters, and so we take the shortcut of dening
intermediate preferences directly in terms of that ordering. Hence, a society will have
intermediate preferences over voting rules if whenever two voters with p
i
and p
j
agree on
how to rank two rules s and s
0
, then all voters with probabilities p
k
between p
i
and p
j
will also agree on the way to rank these two rules. The simple model we are considering
has the following strong feature.
Theorem 2 Every society has preferences over voting rules that satisfy the single cross-
ing property and are intermediate.
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in the appendix. The intuition for why the voters'
peaks over voting rules follow an inverse order to the voters p
i
's (Corollary 3 below),
is fairly straightforward, as voters with higher p
i
's are more likely to favor change and
10
thus will be in favor of a lower quota than voters who are less likely to favor change.
While ordering the peaks is intuitive and useful, we emphasize that Theorem 2 has much
stronger implications, as it relates preferences over arbitrary values of s and s
0
, including
those falling on opposite sides of a set of voters' peaks. This additional structure will also
be useful in what follows. The proof of these aspects of preferences builds inductively from
preferences over adjacent voting rules, and involves direct comparison of the expressions
of dierences in expected utilities for dierent voters. Details are in the appendix.
As just mentioned above, Theorem 2 has the following useful corollary (see the proof
of Theorem 2).
Corollary 3 For any society,
b
s
i

b
s
j
whenever p
j
 p
i
.
There are some other facts about the location of the voters' peaks that are worth
emphasizing. The relative ordering of p
i
's is not only important in determining the
relative ordering over the
b
s
i
's, but it is also critical in determining the actual values of
the
b
s
i
's. This is seen in the following theorem, which states that regardless of p, there is
always some voter who has a peak at least as high as s
maj
and some other voter who has
a peak no higher than s
maj
.
Theorem 4 For any society there exist i and j such that
b
s
i
 s
maj

b
s
j
.
The proof of Theorem 4 is based on the following reasoning. The unique maximizer of
P
i
U
i
(s) is s
maj
, since s
maj
chooses the alternative that will result in the largest group of
voters who get utility 1 for each realization of preferences over a and b (see the concluding
remarks). Thus, if some voter's expected utility is increased by moving to an s that is
higher than s
maj
, then some other voter's expected utility must fall as the result of such
a move. The same is true in reverse. So there is at least one voter with a peak at least
as high as s
maj
and at least one voter with a peak no higher than s
maj
. The complete
proof, taking into account the possibility of twin-peaks appears in the appendix.
Note that by combining Corollary 3 with Theorem 4, we know that the voter who
has the highest p
i
must have a
b
s
i
which is no higher than s
maj
and the voter who has the
lowest p
i
must have a
b
s
i
that is at least as high as s
maj
, and this is true regardless of p.
4 Self-Stable Voting Rules
With some understanding of voters' preferences over voting rules under our belts, we now
examine the issue of existence of self-stable voting rules in some detail.
We begin by considering the special case where all voters have the same p
i
. This is
of some interest where this common p is an indicator of the average propensity to favor
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change of a society's representative voter. It is also worth considering as an exercise, since
the reasoning required for this simple case extends to the analysis of more heterogeneous
societies. Moreover, the conclusion we reach may seem counterintuitive at rst, although
it is easy to reach after some reection.
Theorem 5 If p
i
= p
j
for all i and j, then s
maj
is the unique self-stable rule if n is odd,
while both s
maj
and s
maj
  1 are self-stable if n is even.
Thus, simple majority is the unique self-stable voting rule whenever all voters have
the same probability of choosing change, irrespective of what this probability might be.
One might have guessed that societies where all voters are very likely to want changes
would prefer low values of s, that is low barriers to change, and that homogeneously
conservative societies would favor high values of s. But this is not the case. Actually, in
homogeneous societies, all voters have their peak at
b
s
i
= s
maj
, and thus simple majority
is the consensus choice of rule. This is a simple corollary of Theorem 4. What actually
matters is not the absolute values of the p's but their values relative to those of other
voters. For instance, consider a society where p
i
= :01 for each i and so voters are very
conservative and very likely to support the status-quo. In this case, shouldn't it be that
voters all prefer a high quota s as they each know they are likely to support the status
quo? The answer is no and the reasoning lies in the answer to the following question.
Which alternative would a voter prefer society to choose in a generic realization where k
voters end up supporting a and n  k voters end up supporting b? That is, the voter can
think of the dierent scenarios possible for numbers of voters supporting a and b, and
then ask which side he is most likely to fall on in each scenario. Given the symmetry in
p
i
's, conditional on this realization of preferences it is most likely that the voter is in the
larger of the two groups. So, the voter would like society to choose a in scenarios where
k > n   k and society to choose b in scenarios where k < n   k, and is indierent if
k = n k. Thus, the voter would like society to choose in favor of the majority as that is
where the voter is most likely to be in any realization. Once one understands the above
reasoning, then Theorem 4 and the importance of relative comparisons becomes clear.
Dichotomous Societies
Theorem 5 showed that there always exists a self-stable voting rule in a homogeneous
society. Next, let us examine societies with some heterogeneity, starting with the next
simplest case where society splits into two groups.
A society (N; p) is dichotomous if there exists N
1
6= ;, p
1
2 (0; 1), N
2
6= ;, and
p
2
2 (0; 1) such that N = N
1
[N
2
, p
i
= p
1
for all i 2 N
1
, p
i
= p
2
for all i 2 N
1
.
A dichotomous society is thus one which can be divided into two groups such that
members of the same group have the same p
i
's. For such a society, let n
1
and n
2
denote
the respective cardinalities of N
1
and N
2
.
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Example 1.
N
1
= f1; : : : ; 4g and N
2
= f5; : : : ; 10g with p
1
= :01 and p
2
= :99.
In this society,
b
s
1
= 8 and
b
s
2
= 4.
Let us examine why
b
s
2
= 4 (the intuition for
b
s
1
= 8 is similar). This can be veried
by direct calculations, but also can be seen in an intuitive manner. Let us consider a
voter in N
2
. Consider a scenario where exactly three voters end up supporting change.
Given the extreme values of p
1
= :01 and p
2
= :99, if there are three voters who end up
supporting change, it is very likely that all of those voters are from N
2
. Given that there
are six voters in N
2
this leads to a probability of nearly 1/2 that a voter in N
2
would
assign to supporting change conditional on three voters supporting change. Although
this probability is nearly 1/2, it is still less than 1/2 due to the small probability that
some of the voters in N
1
will be among those supporting change. So, a voter in N
2
will
prefer that society choose the status quo conditional on three voters supporting change.
If we consider a scenario where exactly four voters end up supporting change, then the
conditional probability that a voter in N
2
would assign to being one of the supporters of
change is nearly 2/3. Since it is above 1/2, a voter in N
2
will prefer that society choose
change conditional on four voters supporting change. Given these two observations it
follows that
b
s
2
= 4. Similar reasoning leads to
b
s
1
= 8.
Generally we can think of a voter considering each possible scenario of numbers of
supporters for each of the alternatives. For each scenario the voter determines which
group they are more likely to fall in. The voter's most preferred voting rule (
b
s
i
) cor-
responds to the scenario with the smallest sized group supporting change for which the
voter nds it more likely that he or she will support change. We can see that if the voting
rule is raised or lowered from 4, then there will be some scenarios where the choice will
be made in favor of the group that the voter nds it less likely that he or she will fall in.
We can also see why it is rare for a voter to have twin peaks - as that can only happen
in a case where the voter assigns probability of exactly 1/2 to each of the two groups in
some scenario.
In this example, f7; 8g is the set of self-stable voting rules. It is easy to see that 8 is
self-stable as only group N
2
would like to change voting rules if 8 is used, but then they
only have 6 members and so are too small to make the change under a rule of 8. The
same is true of quota 7, and although in that case group N
1
would like to raise the quota
from 7 to 8 it is too small to do so. To see that no other rule is stable, note that 4 is
unanimously preferred to any smaller rule, and 8 is unanimously preferred to any larger
rule. So the only other candidates for self-stability are the quotas 4, 5, and 6. However,
5 and 6 are not stable because N
2
prefers 4 and has enough voters to move the quota to
4. 4 is not stable since group N
1
would have enough voters to increase the quota.
While in the above example, there were two self-stable voting rules, one could imagine
that if p
1
were larger then a situation would arise where 6 
b
s
1
and 4 
b
s
2
. If that were
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possible, then there would not exist a self-stable voting rule. Then the 6 people in group
2 would want to move the rule from
b
s
1
down to
b
s
2
and the 4 people in group 1 would
want to move the rule up from
b
s
2
to
b
s
1
. As it turns out, however, such examples do not
exist and there always exists a self-stable voting rule in a dichotomous society. This is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 A dichotomous society has at least one self-stable voting rule.
The proof of Theorem 6 involves explicit examination of voters' conditional probabil-
ities that they will support alternative b if k voters support b (the types of conditional
probabilities discussed in Example 1). The proof is complex and provided in the ap-
pendix. Very roughly, it works by relating the conditional beliefs of the two groups to
each other. The main case that has to be ruled out to establish existence is where n
2

b
s
1
and n
1

b
s
2
, when
b
s
1
6=
b
s
2
.
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If the beliefs of N
1
are such that n
2

b
s
1
, this means that
the voters in N
1
have relatively high beliefs that they will be among the supporters of
b. This implies that the voters in N
2
have relatively low beliefs that they will be among
the supporters of b, and so
b
s
2
will be high enough to be larger than n
1
. The challenge
in the proof is to show that these relative statements translate into absolute statements
about the relationship between
b
s
1
and
b
s
2
and their comparison to n
1
and n
2
.
Self-Stability in More Heterogeneous Societies
While there always exists a self-stable voting rule in any dichotomous society, the
same is not true more generally. The reasoning behind the proof of Theorem 6 cannot
be extended, as tying down the beliefs of one group of voters no longer determines what
the conditional beliefs of the remainder must be, given the possible heterogeneity of the
remainder. In fact, the existence of self-stable voting rules is no longer guaranteed if
society has at least three levels taken on by the p
i
's. This is illustrated in the following
counter-example to the general existence of self-stable voting rules.
Example 2.
N = f1; : : : ; 5g. p
1
= p
2
= p
3
= 1=2, p
4
= 3=8, and p
5
= 3=16.
Direct calculations lead to
b
s
1
=
b
s
2
=
b
s
3
= 2,
b
s
4
= 3 and
b
s
5
= 4.
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If, for instance, bs
1
> n
2
then bs
1
would be self-stable. So it would have to be that both n
2
 bs
1
and
n
1
 bs
2
for there not to exist a self-stable rule. Without loss of generality let bs
2
> bs
1
, as the case where
bs
2
= bs
1
would lead to unanimity and thus self- stability. So, to see that if a case existed where n
2
 bs
1
and n
1
 bs
2
when bs
1
6= bs
2
, then there would not exist a self-stable voting rule, note that there would
be unanimous support for change of any s that lies outside of the range between (and including) bs
1
and
bs
2
. Also N
1
would want to change away (and could change) from and s such that bs
2
 s > bs
1
. Finally,
N
2
would want to change from bs
1
.
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Let us verify that there is no self-stable voting procedure. All voters want to raise
the quota from 1 and lower it from 5. That leaves the quotas of 2,3, and 4 to be checked
as the only possibilities for self-stable voting rules. Voters 1 to 3 would vote to lower it
from 3 to 2, voters 1 to 4 would vote to lower it from 4 to 3, and voters 3 and 4 would
vote to raise it from 2 to 3. Thus, no voting rule is self-stable.
The possibility that a society may not have a self-stable voting rule is striking, to say
the least. In order to understand its implications, it is worth discussing more extensively
when this phenomenon can occur, and what practical implications it may have.
We begin by identifying some conditions on the distribution of p's that guarantee the
existence of self-stable rules.
Say that a society is symmetric if when voters are labeled such that p
i
 p
j
when
i > j, it follows that p
i
= 1  p
n i
.
Proposition 7 If a society is symmetric, then s
maj
is a self-stable voting rule.
This fact is an easy corollary of Theorem 8, below.
Let
b
s
med
denote the median of (
b
s
1
; : : : ;
b
s
n
), i.e., the median of the peaks of the voters.
Note the following simple condition for existence.
Remark: If
b
s
med
 s
maj
, then
b
s
med
is self-stable.
When
b
s
med
 s
maj
, then at most half of the population would like to lower the rule
below the median, and at most half would like to increase it above the median, and since
b
s
med
 s
maj

n+1
2
, it follows that
b
s
med
be self-stable.
The above remark points at some asymmetry in the role of majority sizes that are
above s
maj
and those that are below. This asymmetry is further emphasized by the
following result, which also establishes that, although instances of nonexistence of self-
stable rules may be robust, there are more societies where self-stable rules exist than for
where they fail to exist.
Theorem 8 If there does not exist a self-stable voting rule for a society (N; p), then there
exists a self-stable voting rule for the society (N; p), where p is dened by p
i
= 1  p
i
for
each i. Moreover,
b
s
med
is self-stable for society (N; p).
The proof of Theorem 8 is relatively simple and so we just provide a sketch. It follows
from the observation that the setting we are examining is symmetric in the following way:
if in society (N; p) voter i would like society to choose b conditional only on knowing that
s voters out of society favor b, then in society (N; p) voter i would like society to choose
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a conditional only on knowing that s voters out of society favor a. This implies that if
b
s
i
is i's peak under society (N; p), then n  
b
s
i
+ 1 is i's peak under society (N; p). To
establish the theorem, note that non-existence of a self-stable voting rule implies that
b
s
med
is no larger than
n
2
, as otherwise it would be self-stable. The reasoning above then
implies that
b
s
med
for society (N; p) is larger than
n
2
, and so is stable.
Despite its simple proof, Theorem 8 has some powerful implications. It implies that
non-existence is a problem for less than \half" of the potential societies in terms of the
p's.
As already remarked, Proposition 7, which asserts the existence of self-stable voting
rules for symmetric societies, is an easy corollary of Theorem 8.
Before proceeding further, let us make some additional remarks about self-stable
voting rules.
When self-stable voting rules exist, there may be a number of them. Moreover, the
set of self-stable voting rules need not be an interval, nor need it include s
maj
. These
points are illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.
The society (N; p) is dichotomous.
N
1
= f1; : : : ; 5g and N
2
= f6; : : : ; 16g with p
1
= :01 and p
2
= :99.
Here
b
s
1
= 14 and
b
s
2
= 6.
It follows that f6; 12; 13; 14g is the set of self-stable voting rules.
It is clear that the set of self-stable voting rules will consist of a set of intervals, each
of which includes at least one
b
s
i
. This puts an upper bound on the number of disjoint
intervals that can be included, at the number of distinct p
i
's that are present in the
society.
As we have seen so far, self-stable rules will exist for many, but not all, societies. Does
this mean we should take the possibility that a society might not nd a self-stable rule
as a serious threat to the stability of actual constitutions or is it just a curiosity? Next,
we will show that this possibility of instability that we have unearthed may help explain
the reason why many actual societies resort to special rules when it comes to changing
the voting rules. This is discussed in the next section where we turn to the denition
and the characterization of self-stable constitutions.
Sub-Majority Voting Rules
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Before turning to the question of constitutional design, let us comment on some
problems related to the choice of majority sizes smaller than s
maj
:
Rules with s < s
maj
can be problematic in the following sense. Consider a situation
where a and b are each supported by half of the population. A vote under s will result in
b becoming the new status quo. But then, with b as the new status quo, the other half
of the voters would support (and could eect) change back to a if it is proposed for a
vote against b. Thus, there is the potential to continuously cycle back and forth between
a and b as the status quo. This, of course, is only a potential problem of sub-majority
rules.
Note that there are two caveats to the above noted diÆculty with sub-majority rules.
First, for some alternatives it may not be possible to make reversals. For instance, if a is
a current membership of a society and b is a question to include a new member, it may
not be permitted to later vote to revoke membership. There are many such examples
of decisions which cannot be reversed, such as a vote to tenure a faculty member, or a
vote to declare war, etc.. Second, the diÆculty requires that one reasonably expect that
the reversed proposal be made, and so the agenda control becomes important. It may
be that the agenda is controlled in manners so that once b has been voted for, a is never
again pitted as an alternative. We have abstracted away from the agenda in our model,
and a more complete analysis of the potential instability of sub-majority rules demands
a careful modeling of the agenda.
In spite of these caveats, this possible chaotic behavior associated with sub-majority
rules is not to be taken lightly, and so we discuss its importance with regards to our
analysis from two dierent perspectives.
First, we consider the possibility that a society somehow precludes itself from ever
selecting a sub-majority rule. If this is the case, then the existence of self-stable voting
rules is ensured. To see this, consider such a society. The preferences of voters over the
restricted set of s's (s  s
maj
) are still single peaked. Voters whose unrestricted peaks
were at least s
maj
have the same peak on the restricted set, while voters whose peaks
were below s
maj
now have s
maj
as a peak. The median of the restricted peaks will be
self-stable over the restricted set of voting rules. This leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 9 For any society where only s  s
maj
are admissible voting rules,
b
s
med
(de-
ned relative to restricted preferences) is a self-stable voting rule.
The proof follows the argument of the remark we made earlier in this section. Hence,
for societies who nd that s's below s
maj
should be excluded from the analysis on a priori
grounds, we can still oer a theory for the choice of rules, and add a new property, that
of self-stability, to the already well justied choice of the median based-rules.
Despite the reassuring nature of the above theorem, we should not close our eyes to
the possibility that societies might consider sub-majority rules, in spite of their potential
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for chaotic decision making behavior. From a positive viewpoint, there is evidence of
chaotic behavior, cycles and swings in many collective-decision making processes. We
shall not insist on that, but a theory based on the idea that voters actually vote on
how to vote should not exclude the possibility that some voters would support rather
unstable arrangements. It is also rare that the possibility of a sub-majority voting rule is
prohibited by at. More importantly, a democratic constitution is open to amendment.
If under current rules, a suÆcient majority prefers a sub-majority voting rule there may
be nothing to prevent them from making that change. This is precisely the diÆculty
that arises with the lack of existence of self-stable rules: some super-majority prefers a
sub-majority rule, and they have suÆcient numbers to enact that change to the current
system.
Finally, notice that in example 3, a rule with s below s
maj
(s=6) emerges as self-stable,
along with others involving values above majority.
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Excluding these low value rules a
priori will deprive us of knowing all possible stable arrangements, when they exist.
5 Self-Stable Constitutions
We now explore the consequences of admitting constitutions that allow for dierent voting
rules to be used for making dierent types of decisions. This will solve the existence
problems noted in the previous section, and provides an explanation for such structure
in observed constitutions. A constitution can specify one voting rule to be used on all
issues except for the change of this \standard" rule, where a dierent rule may be used.
The analysis above suggests that there are situations where this would be natural, and
provides an understanding of why this should be the case.
A constitution is a pair of voting rules (s; S), where s is to be used in votes over the
issues a; b and S is to be used in any votes regarding changes from s to any other rule
s
0
.
1617
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Moreover, there exist examples where the only self-stable rules are sub-majority rules. For example,
consider a dichotomous society with N
1
= f1; 2g and N
2
= f3; : : : ; 7g with p
1
= :3 and p
2
= :5.
Straightforward calculations lead to bs
1
= 5 and bs
2
= 3. There s = 3 is the only self-stable rule.
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There are many examples where such pairs of rules are in place. For instance, the U.S. senate uses
simple majority rule, and a 67/100 rule to change the senate rules. In fact, under the libusters that
are possible in the senate, one needs 60/100 votes to call a vote and so the eective voting rule might
be thought of as a (60,67) rule rather than a (50,67) rule. An interesting (unstable) example arose
recently in California. Under the law until 2000, school bond and tax issues required a 2/3 majority of
the participating voters to pass. So we might think of these votes as having the rule s be 2/3 of the
voters. However, propositions (initiatives that may be placed on the ballot through a variety of means)
in California may be passed with a 1/2 majority. In particular, one can place a proposition on the ballot
which changes the vote required on such issues. Thus, one can amend the rule by a 1/2 vote. Thus we
can think of S as being 1/2 of the voters. In fact in the 2000 election, Proposition 39 suggested changing
the voting rule on school bond and tax issues from 2/3 to 55%. Interestingly, Proposition 39 passed with
53.4% (as reported by the Secretary of State of California) of the vote. Having a 2/3 majority voting
rule that can be amended by a 1/2 vote is inherently unstable.
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As pointed out to us by Randy Calvert, one could also think of a more general nesting of rules,
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A constitution (s; S)) is self-stable if #fi jU
i
(s
0
) > U
i
(s)g < S for any s
0
:.
Self-stability of a constitution requires that the preferences of voters be such that
there does not exist a voting rule s
0
that would defeat the constitution's prescribed
voting rule s to be used for choices over issues, when these two voting rules are compared
under the constitution's voting rule S, to be used for choices over rules. So, a self-stable
constitution is one that would not be changed once in place.
Theorem 10 For any society, the constitutions (s
maj
; n) and (
b
s
med
; S) for any S  s
maj
are self-stable.
Theorem 10 follows is a straightforward consequence of our theorems on intermediate
preferences (Theorem 2) and on relative positioning of voter's peaks (Theorem 4), and so
we simply oer a description of the proof as follows. The self-stability of (s
maj
; n) follows
from the observation that by Theorems 4 and 2 there is always at least one voter who
will wish to keep the voting rule over issues no higher than s
maj
and at least one who will
wish to keep the voting rule no lower than s
maj
. Thus, there is no unanimous consent
to raise or lower the voting rule from s
maj
. The self-stability of (
b
s
med
; S) with S  s
maj
follows from Theorem 2 and the denition of
b
s
med
, as by intermediate preferences fewer
than n=2 voters will prefer to raise the voting rule from
b
s
med
, and similarly fewer than
n=2 voters will prefer to lower the voting rule from
b
s
med
.
Theorem 10 is essentially tight in the sense that for any (s; S) that does not coincide
with either (s
maj
; n) or (
b
s
med
; S) with S  s
maj
, there is some situations in which (s; S)
is not self-stable (with a single exception that (s
maj
; n  1) is always self-stable whenever
n is odd).
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Let us be more explicit. First, consider (s; S) with some s 6= s
maj
. If p
is such that p
i
= p
j
for all i and j then
b
s
i
= s
maj
for all i and so any (s; S) for which
s 6= s
maj
=
b
s
med
will be unstable regardless of S. So we need only consider (s; S) where
s = s
maj
or s =
b
s
med
. We can see the problem with (
b
s
med
; S) where S < s
maj
from
Example 2, as it is possible to have societies where a near majority prefers to move the
voting rule away from
b
s
med
.
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Finally, when considering (s
maj
; S) with S < n (S < n  1
if n is odd), consider a society where voter 1 has p
1
near 0 (and the same for voter 2 in
the case of n being odd), and all other voters have the same p
i
near 1. For high enough
p
i
, voters i will have probability greater than 1/2 of supporting change when there are
n=2 supporters of change if n is even and when there are (n  1)=2 supporters of change
where one thinks of a voting rule S
0
to amend (s; S), and so on; and it might be interesting to consider
when these may be truncated (as eectively the case of a pair means that the same S is used for all
higher orders).
18
Note that any Pareto optimal s is stable when put together with n. The claim here is that s
maj
is
the only s that is Pareto optimal for all societies.
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More generally, consider a society with a single voter who has the median preferences and other voters
who have extreme p
i
's near 0 and 1, who will prefer to lower or raise the voting rule. In particular, the
voters with p
i
's near enough to 1 will prefer an s < bs
med
over bs
med
and there will be at least s
maj
  1
such voters.
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when n is odd. This leads to peaks of s
maj
  1 for the voters with p
i
near 1, and so they
will vote to decrease the voting rule if it is set at s
maj
.
In summary. For each society, there will always be at least two self-stable constitutions
(three when n is odd).
Although we have treated the constitutions (s
maj
; n) and (
b
s
med
; S) on equal footing in
the statement of Theorem 10, notice the following essential dierence. The constitution
(
b
s
med
; S) varies across societies, since
b
s
med
depends on the distribution of p
i
's. On the
other hand, (s
maj
; n) is the same across all societies of the same size. Hence, (s
maj
; n) is
a stable constitution regardless of the society, while a constitution of the form (
b
s
med
; S)
is by denition tailored to a specic society.
Simple Majority Constitutions
The self-stability of constitutions involving simple majority rule is of particular inter-
est because of the prominence of simple majority in actual constitutions and its special
properties including overall eÆciency (see the concluding remarks for additional discus-
sion). We have just seen that the particular constitution (s
maj
; n) is, in addition, very
robust, since it self-stable for any society. We now explore the conditions on the distribu-
tion of p
i
's that are suÆcient for other constitutions (s
maj
; S) to be self-stable for values
of S < n.
Let z
i
=
p
i
1 p
i
: Thus, z
i
represents the ratio of the probability that i supports change
compared to the probability that i supports the status quo. Any positive number is a
potential z
i
.
Theorem 11 For any society with even n the constitution (s
maj
; S) is self-stable if
S > jfi :
X
CN;jCj=
n
2
;i2C
(
j2C
z
j
) 
X
CN;jCj=
n
2
;i=2C
(
j2C
z
j
)gj > n  S: (3)
Note that (3) can be rewritten as
S > jfi : z
i

X
k 6=i

i
k
z
k
gj > n  S; (4)
where

i
k
=
2
n
P
jCj=
n
2
 1;i;k =2C
(
j2C
z
j
)
P
jCj=
n
2
 1;i=2C;
(
j2C
z
j
)
:
Here, the 
i
k
are weights such that
P
k 6=i

i
k
= 1, and so
P
k 6=i

i
k
z
k
is a weighted average
of z
k
's over k's other than i. Thus, (4) says roughly that the number of voters with above
average z
i
's is not too high and not too low. It can be shown that this is also equivalent
to having the number of voters with below average z
i
's not be too high or too low.
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Condition (3) is almost a necessary condition as well, except for the possibility that
one particular voter (the n   S-th voter when ordered in terms of decreasing p
i
's) has
peak exactly at s
maj
which allows for a slightly weaker condition.
To see the implications of Theorem 11, let us consider the constitution where s
0
=
2n=3. That constitution is stable, provided there are at least 1/3 of the voters who do
not wish to raise the voting rule from s
maj
and at least 1/3 of the voters who do not
wish to lower it from s
maj
. The proof of the theorem involves showing that these are
equivalent to the inequalities relating the z
i
's. The requirements of the theorem are then
that at least 1/3 and no more than 2/3 of the voters have a z
i
that is bigger than the
weighted average of the other voters' z
i
's. This is in eect a limitation on the skewness
of the distribution of the z
i
's (or, in eect, the p
i
's). If the distribution of z
i
's is not too
skewed, then (s
maj
; 2n=3) will be self-stable.
6 Concluding Remarks
There are a number of dimensions along which our model has been simplied, such as
taking the agenda to be a binary one, taking the agenda to be exogenous, examining
only anonymous voting rules, considering non-repeated environments, and considering a
xed population of voters. Relaxing some of these restrictions provides a rich agenda for
further research. Some of these dimensions we have little feeling for at this point, while
others we have given some preliminary thought to as we briey discuss below.
Anonymity
Anonymity has been presumed in our analysis through the denition of a voting rule.
Allowing for non-anonymous rules can help with self-stability. For instance, dictatorial
rules are clearly self-stable. There are contexts where non-anonymous rules are quite
natural, as when certain voters have seniority or other priority in a society. Thus, it
would be interesting to consider various non-anonymous rules (other than dictatorships)
to understand their self-stability properties.
20
This issue alone presents a fairly rich
agenda for further study of endogenous voting rules.
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Large Numbers
We have deliberately worked with nite societies for two reasons. First, there are
many applications where the society in question is small and not well approximated
by an innite society. Second, if one worked with a continuum society (or some other
20
The class of voting rules can be modeled by the class of simple games, which list the coalitions of
agents can enforce change over the status quo. The extension of self-stability is then to consider the
voting rules for which there is no alternative preferred by all members of some winning coalition.
21
A new paper by Sosnowska (2002) extends the model here to weighted voting rules.
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innite model), then, without making additional assumptions about the distribution
of the underlying uncertainty, a (suitable) law of large numbers would eliminate the
uncertainty over the proportion of society supporting change over the status quo. This
uncertainty is the critical aspect that makes for non-degenerate and interesting voters'
preferences over voting rules.
While we chose to work with a nite model, it is still interesting to ask questions
about large societies.
22
Example 2 extends when the society is replicated a large number
of times, and so general existence of self-stable voting rules will not come simply from
considering a large society. However, there may be some interesting conditions that are
suÆcient for self-stability one can obtain from looking at large societies.
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Preferences
Assuming that a voter gets a utility of 1 when his preferred alternative is selected and
0 otherwise involves more than a normalization. Instead, it could be that when voter i
supports a then i gets utility 1 if a is selected and 0 if b is selected, while when voter i
supports b then i gets utility x
i
when b is selected and 0 if a is selected.
This more general setting leads to changes in the analysis in the following ways.
First, Theorem 1 on single-peaked preferences goes through unaltered and it is easily
checked that the proof works with only slight modication.
Second, the extension of Theorem 2 on intermediate preferences is a more complicated
matter. There are now two characteristics that distinguish voters and so nding an
ordering on voters for which their preferences are intermediate is more delicate. In the
case where x
i
 x
j
whenever p
i
 p
j
(so that voters who are more likely to support
alternative b care relatively more about alternative b), preferences are still intermediate.
Again, for this situation the proof goes through with very little modication. This would
seem to be a natural condition. However, if there is no such relationship between the
x
i
's and the p
i
's, then preferences may fail to be intermediate, and it is easy to construct
counter-examples.
The existence of self-stable voting rules with dichotomous preferences, Theorem 6,
depends on the property that a voter cares (in expectation, at least) similarly for having a
win when the voter supports a and having b win when the voter supports b. Without that
assumption, examples can be constructed where there does not exist a self-stable voting
rule. However, Theorem 8 extends under an ordering that preserves the intermediate
preferences.
22
See Schoeld (1971) for some calculations concerning voters' preferences in large heterogeneous
societies.
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One possibility is to think about conditions on the distributions of p
i
's, in an analogous way that con-
ditions identied by Caplin and Nalebu (1988) on distributions of preferences suÆce for an alternative
with nice properties in their setting.
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Another aspect of preferences that might be due for further consideration is the
assumption of the independence of the probabilities that the voters support change.
This assumption played a role in our proof of single-peakedness. Most importantly, this
ensures that likelihood that a voter has that they support change conditional on k voters
supporting change is be monotone in k. With certain forms of correlation, this conditional
probability may no longer be monotone. While arbitrary forms of correlation could be
diÆcult to accommodate, there are natural ones which still allow for such monotonicity
and would thus still be tractable.
Dynamics and the Time Perspective
In our analysis we have considered the choice of a voting rule at a time where pref-
erences over the alternatives to be voted on are uncertain, but voters have probability
assessments over their likelihoods of supporting change over the status quo.
What if we consider dierent time perspectives?
First, if we move back in time to an ex-ante point of view (before voters know the
p
i
's), then simple majority rule becomes attractive as it maximizes total utility, and
hence ex-ante utility if voters have similar beliefs about what their p
i
's are likely to be.
However, unless s
maj
turns out to be self-stable or else voters can bind themselves not
to make future changes, one has to address the issue of changes that can be made once
the p
i
's are known. So, we still need to consider the interim perspective, unless there is
a way to make future changes in rules impossible.
We can also consider moving forward in time to an ex-post point of view, where
voters know which alternatives they support. If a voting rule is already in place from the
interim perspective, there will be no changes made. To see this, note that the voters in
favor of changing the voting rule will be the voters who are not getting the choice that
they want. If they are not getting the choice that they want under the current voting
rule s, then they must be a group of less than s voters and so could not aect a change.
While the ex-post perspective has no implications for self-stable voting rules, it can
change the outcome for some self-stable constitutions. In particular, it can destabilize
constitutions of the form (s; s
0
) where s > s
0
. In such a case, if there turn out to be s
00
voters in favor of change, where s > s
00
 s
0
, then the s
00
voters will vote to change the
voting rule to s
00
. This problem arises only for constitutions where s > s
0
, and so if a
constitution has s
0
 s, then there will be no incentive for voters to change it ex-post.
An issue that is of interest for future investigation arises in a dynamic situation where
voters face a sequence of choices. Consider a situation where voters already know their
preferences on a current choice, but only have limited knowledge over future choices.
Here there is a possibility of a voter's preferences over voting rules going against their
immediate (myopic) wishes, due to the longer horizon. This issue is pointed out in the
following example.
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Example 4.
N = f1; : : : ; 8g. p
1
= p
2
= p
3
= :01, p
4
= p
5
= :49, and p
6
= p
7
= p
8
= :99.
In this case, direct calculations lead to
b
s
1
=
b
s
2
=
b
s
3
= 2,
b
s
4
=
b
s
5
= 5 and
b
s
6
=
b
s
7
=
b
s
8
= 7.
The self-stable voting rules are f5; 6; 7g.
Now let us adopt a longer time perspective. Suppose we are using the voting rule
s = 5.
Consider a realization where society evenly splits between a and b, and in particular
voters 1 to 3 and 6 support a and 4, 5, 7 and 8 support b. Under the voting rule s = 5
the status quo a will be chosen.
Consider the incentives of the voters to change the voting rule. If the rule is changed
from 5 to 4 then b would be chosen instead of a.
Voters 4 and 5 will gain 1 unit of utility today, but lose U
4
(5)  U
4
(4) in each of the
future periods. This expression is close to 0, and so for all except very high discount
factors, the time discounted future loss in expected utility from changing from a voting
rule of 5 to 4 is less than 1. So, for discount factors that are not too high, voters 4 and
5 will support a change to a voting rule of 4. Voters 7 and 8 would gain today and in
the future such a change. Voter 6 would lose 1 unit of utility today from such a change,
but would gain U
6
(5)   U
6
(4) discounted over the future horizon. While U
4
(5)   U
4
(4)
is close to 0, U
6
(5)  U
6
(4) is not. Thus for some range of discount factors, voters 4 to 8
would all support a change from 5 to 4.
Simple majority as a special rule: EÆciency and Immunity to Vote Trading
We close by pointing out two related important features, arising in the model that
we used here, that give a special status to s
maj
.
A rst property was the focus of Rae (1969) (and later proven by Curtis (1972) and
Badger (1972)). It is that s
maj
maximizes total societal welfare, and it is essentially
the only rule to do so. More precisely, for any society (N; p), s
maj
uniquely maximizes
P
i
U
i
(s), unless n is even in which case
n
2
also maximizes
P
i
U
i
(s). This property can
also be seen as an ex ante eÆciency property (from the perspective before voters know
their p
i
's, where they each have the same beliefs). There is a fairly direct proof of this
property.
24
Majority rule maximizes total societal welfare at each ex post realization of
preferences over a and b since it maximizes the number of 1's realized as utility compared
to 0's that are realized. Any other rule (except
n
2
when n is even) realizes a lower total
24
Much more complex proofs appear in Curtis (1972) and Badger (1972).
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utility at some ex post realization of preferences as it will select one of the alternatives
when a minority supports it (favoring a if s > s
maj
or b if s < s
maj
).
A second property that is related to the utilitarian property of simple majority rule, is
that it is the only voting rule that is immune to the trading of votes by the grand coalition.
This point is made more precisely below. The intuition behind it is straightforward but
is still worth making, as it suggests that the utilitarian property of simple majority rule
not only has welfare implications, but also implications in terms of incentives.
Describe a realization of preferences by C  N , where C is the set of voters who
support the change over the status quo.
Consider the possibility that voters trade votes as follows. For each C that could be
realized, a randomization device says \trade" with some probability p
C
and \no trade"
with probability 1  p
C
. \Trade" is then interpreted as having the voters in the minority
group reverse their votes. Under \no trade", all voters vote in their own interest.
In the above situation vote trading is described by a randomization device, where in
some (random) circumstances the minority of voters are called on to reverse their votes.
They do this with the expectation that there are other situations where they will be in
the majority and benet from having the minority reverse their votes. If the vote is only
a one time happening, then one would need a commitment to abide by the randomization
device in order to have such a scheme work. If there is a sequence of choices to be made
(and not too much discounting by voters), then the p
C
's can be thought of as frequencies
and votes can indeed be traded in a quid-pro-quo or self- sustaining manner.
So a vote trading scheme is a list fp
C
g
CN
of the probabilities that votes are traded
for the various possible realized groups supporting change.
Note that when \trade" is in eect, the votes are cast unanimously and in favor of
what the majority of voters prefers. So eectively, a vote trading scheme transforms a
voting rule to choose as s
maj
would in a limited (random) set of circumstances. For every
voting rule except s
maj
this reverses the outcome in some scenarios.
A voting trading scheme fp
C
g
CN
upsets a voting rule s, if every voter's expected
utility is higher under the vote trading scheme given the rule s than if they voted in their
own interest under s.
A voting rule s is immune to vote trading if it is not upset by any vote trading scheme.
It is now easy to verify that simple majority rule is the only voting rule that is immune
to vote trading, unless n is even in which case n=2 is also immune to vote trading. (This
is proven in the appendix.)
While simple majority rule is uniquely immune to vote trading, we should point out
that the denition requires that all voters be made better o. We can also consider vote
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trading by sub-coalitions. It turns out that no voting rule is immune to vote trading
by sub-coalitions (provided that n  4). This is seen as follows: pick an arbitrary sub-
coalition of three voters, say f1; 2; 3g. Operate a vote trading scheme as follows. Consider
all situations where f1; 2g are on the losing side of the vote and 3 is on the winning side
and is pivotal - i.e., 3 is able to change the vote by reversing her vote. With n  4
there is at least one such a scenario for every voting rule s. Have a probability p
3
that
3 reverses her vote conditional on being in such a situation. Choose corresponding p
1
and p
2
's. These can be chosen so that the probability that each of the voters 1,2, and 3
unconditionally expects to be on the beneting side of the vote more often than in the
position of being called on to reverse their vote. Thus, each of the voters in f1; 2; 3g
would strictly benet from following this scheme.
As we have seen simple majority is not perfect. It is not always self-stable and it
is subject to some forms of vote trading. But it is certainly a salient rule, for many
reasons, including those mentioned above, and can always be made part of a self-stable
constitution. In fact, the lack of self-stability of majority rule (as well as others) pro-
vides insight into the prevalence of constitutions with separate voting rules for standard
decisions versus amendments of the constitution.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Let D
i
(s) = U
i
(s)  U
i
(s  1). From equation (2) it follows that
D
i
(s) = (1  p
i
)P
i
(s  1)  p
i
P
i
(s  2): (5)
Thus,
D
i
(s) = P
i
(s  1)(1  p
i
P
i
(s  1) + P
i
(s  2)
P
i
(s  1)
):
Note that U
i
is single-peaked if there exists
b
s
i
(possibly equal to 1 or n) such that
D
i
(s) > 0 for every
b
s
i
> s  2, D
i
(s) < 0 for every n  s >
b
s
i
, and D
i
(s)  0 at s =
b
s
i
(with equality holding only when there are twin peaks). Thus, if we can show that D
i
(s)
has this form, then we will have shown that U
i
is single-peaked.
Note that the sign of D
i
(s) depends only on the size of
P
i
(s 1)+P
i
(s 2)
P
i
(s 1)
relative to
1
p
i
.
This means that showing that
P
i
(s 1)+P
i
(s 2)
P
i
(s 1)
is increasing in s for n  s  2 establishes
that D
i
(s) has the form specied above. Rewriting
P
i
(s  1) + P
i
(s  2)
P
i
(s  1)
= 1 +
P
i
(s  2)
P
i
(s  1)
;
means that we need only show that
P
i
(s 2)
P
i
(s 1)
is increasing
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in s.
We follow a proof by induction on n. The case where n = 2 is trivial, since then
there is only one s that satises n  s  2. Now for the induction step. Suppose that
P
i
(s   2)=P
i
(s   1) is increasing for any n
0
 s  2 for societies of size n   1  n
0
. We
show that P
i
(s  2)=P
i
(s  1) is increasing for any n  s  2.
Let
P
i;j
(s) =
X
CNnfi;jg:jCj=s

`2C
p
`

k=2C
(1  p
k
):
P
i;j
(s) is the probability that exactly s of the voters other than i and j support the
change.
P
i
(s  2)
P
i
(s  1)
=
p
j
P
i;j
(s  3) + (1  p
j
)P
i;j
(s  2)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  2) + (1  p
j
)P
i;j
(s  1)
;
where P
i;j
(s  3) = 0 when s = 2. Rewrite the above equality as
P
i
(s  2)
P
i
(s  1)
=
p
j
P
i;j
(s  3)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  2) + (1  p
j
)P
i;j
(s  1)
+
(1  p
j
)P
i;j
(s  2)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  2) + (1  p
j
)P
i;j
(s  1)
: (6)
25
When we say \increasing" we refer to the strict sense, and we use the term \non-decreasing" to refer
to the weaker sense.
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We show that each term on the right hand side of (6) is increasing in s for n  s  2.
Take the rst term. It is clear that since P
i;j
(s  3) = 0 when s = 2, that it is increasing
from s = 2 to s = 3. So, we need only show that its inverse is decreasing in s for
n  s  3.
p
j
P
i;j
(s  2) + (1  p
j
)P
i;j
(s  1)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  3)
=
p
j
P
i;j
(s  2)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  3)
+
(1  p
j
)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  1)
P
i;j
(s  3)
=
p
j
P
i;j
(s  2)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  3)
+
(1  p
j
)
p
j
P
i;j
(s  1)
P
i;j
(s  2)
P
i;j
(s  2)
P
i;j
(s  3)
: (7)
Note that the induction step implies that
P
i;j
(s 2)
P
i;j
(s 3)
is increasing in s for n  s  3. So,
each expression on the right hand side is decreasing in s for each n   1  s  3 by the
induction step, and so the overall expression is. So we only have to worry about the case
where s = n and the expression
P
i;j
(s 1)
P
i;j
(s 2)
. Note that P
i;j
(n   1) = 0, and so this follows
as well.
Recall that the expression in (7) is the inverse of the rst term on the right hand side
of (6). A similar argument establishes that the second term on the right hand side of (6)
is increasing in s.
Proof of Theorem 2:
We rst show that U
i
(s)  U
i
(s   1) implies that U
j
(s)  U
j
(s   1) for any j such
that p
j
 p
i
. Recall that
U
i
(s)  U
i
(s  1) = (1  p
i
)P
i
(s  1)  p
i
P
i
(s  2):
So, we write
U
i
(s) U
i
(s 1) = (1 p
i
)(P
i;j
(s 2)p
j
+P
i;j
(s 1)(1 p
j
)) p
i
(P
i;j
(s 3)p
j
+P
i;j
(s 2)(1 p
j
)):
Likewise,
U
j
(s) U
j
(s 1) = (1 p
j
)(P
i;j
(s 2)p
i
+P
i;j
(s 1)(1 p
i
)) p
j
(P
i;j
(s 3)p
i
+P
i;j
(s 2)(1 p
i
)):
It follows that
[U
i
(s)  U
i
(s  1)]  [U
j
(s)  U
j
(s  1)] = 2(p
j
  p
i
)P
i;j
(s  2):
Notice that the right hand side of the above equation is nonnegative, because p
j
 p
i
.
So, we have shown that
U
i
(s)  U
i
(s  1)  U
j
(s)  U
j
(s  1); (8)
whenever p
j
 p
i
. Note that if s > s
0
, then
U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
) =
s
X
k=s
0
+1
U
i
(k)  U
i
(k   1): (9)
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So, (9) implies that
U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
)  U
j
(s)  U
j
(s
0
); (10)
whenever p
j
 p
i
, provided s > s
0
. This establishes that preferences satisfy the single-
crossing property.
We now show that this implies that preferences are intermediate.
First, consider the case where U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
), U
j
(s)  U
j
(s
0
), p
j
 p
k
 p
i
and s > s
0
.
Since U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
) and p
k
 p
i
, (10) implies that U
k
(s)  U
k
(s
0
) (with strict inequality
if the strict inequality holds for i). So, the desired conclusion of intermediate preferences
is established for this case (and the corresponding strict inequality case). Next, consider
the case where U
i
(s)  U
i
(s
0
), U
j
(s)  U
j
(s
0
), p
j
 p
k
 p
i
and s < s
0
. Suppose to
the contrary that U
k
(s
0
) > U
k
(s). Then since p
j
 p
k
it follows from (10 ) (applied
with the roles of s and s
0
reversed) that U
j
(s
0
) > U
j
(s), which is a contradiction. Thus,
our supposition was incorrect and so U
k
(s)  U
k
(s
0
). Finally, consider the case where
U
i
(s) > U
i
(s
0
), U
j
(s) > U
j
(s
0
), p
j
 p
k
 p
i
and s < s
0
. Suppose to the contrary that
U
k
(s
0
)  U
k
(s). Then since p
j
 p
k
it follows from (10) (applied with the roles of s and
s
0
reversed) that U
j
(s
0
)  U
j
(s) , which is a contradiction. Thus, our supposition was
incorrect and so U
k
(s) > U
k
(s
0
). We have shown that preferences are intermediate.
Proof of Theorem 4:s
maj
maximizes total societal welfare (see the concluding remarks),
as it always results in the maximal number of voters who get a utility of 1. Consider
the case where some voter j's peak is greater than s
maj
. So, U
j
(s
maj
+ 1)  U
j
(s
maj
).
As
P
i
U
i
(s
maj
) >
P
i
U
i
(s
maj
+ 1), it follows that there exists some i with U
i
(s
maj
+ 1) <
U
i
(s
maj
) which by single-peaked preferences (Theorem 1) implies that s
maj

b
s
i
. We are
left with the case where all voters' peaks are no more than s
maj
. Suppose to the contrary
of Theorem 4 that all the peaks are strictly less than s
maj
. By the single-peakedness of
preferences, this implies that U
i
(s
maj
  1) > U
i
(s
maj
) for all i, which contradicts the fact
that s
maj
maximizes
P
i
U
i
(s). Thus our supposition was incorrect and the Theorem is
established.
Proof of Theorem 6: Let n
2
= #N
2
and n
1
= #N
1
, and without loss of generality
take p
1
 p
2
.
In the case where p
1
= p
2
it is easily checked that all preferences are identical with
b
s
i
= n=2 + 1 if n is even, and
b
s
i
= (n + 1)=2 if n is odd. In that case,
b
s
i
is self-stable.
So, we consider the case where p
1
> p
2
, n
1
 1, and n
2
 1.
Theorem 4 and Corollary 3 implies that
b
s
2
 s
maj

b
s
1
, since p
2
< p
1
. If n
2
 s
maj
,
then it must be that s
maj
> n
1
and so
b
s
2
is self-stable. Therefore, we need only examine
the case where n
1
 s
maj
> n
2
.
Suppose to the contrary that there is no self-stable voting rule. It must be that
n
2

b
s
1
and n
1

b
s
2
. Thus,
n
1

b
s
2
 s
maj
> n
2

b
s
1
(11)
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and p
2
< p
1
.
For k 2 f1; : : : ; ng, let q
b
i
(k) be the probability that a voter of type i 2 f1; 2g supports
b conditional on knowing that k voters support b. Correspondingly, let q
a
i
(k) be the
probability that a voter of type i 2 f1; 2g supports a conditional on knowing that k
voters support a. By the denition of q
a
i
and q
b
i
it follows that
q
a
i
(k) = 1  q
b
i
(n  k): (12)
Note that i's peak is the largest s
0
such that q
b
i
(s
0
)  1=2 and 1=2  q
b
i
(s) for s < s
0
.
Below we will establish that
q
a
2
(k)
k
>
q
a
2
(k + 1)
(k + 1)
: (13)
Before proving (13), let us argue that this will complete the proof. Since q
b
2
(
b
s
2
)  1=2 it
follows that 1=2  q
a
2
(n 
b
s
2
). So, by (13) (applied iteratively) it follows that
1=2 > q
a
2
(n 
b
s
1
)
n 
b
s
2
n 
b
s
1
:
From the inequality above, we then have
n
2
q
a
2
(n 
b
s
1
) <
n
2
2
n 
b
s
1
n 
b
s
2
:
Since it must be that n
1
q
a
1
(n  s) + n
2
q
a
2
(n  s) = n  s, it follows that
n
1
q
a
1
(n 
b
s
1
) > n 
b
s
1
 
n
2
2
n 
b
s
1
n 
b
s
2
:
Noting that n 
b
s
1
 n
1
(recall that n
1
+ n
2
= n and n
2

b
s
1
from inequality (11)), the
previous inequality requires that
q
a
1
(n 
b
s
1
) > 1 
n
2
2(n 
b
s
2
)
:
Since n  
b
s
2
 n
2
(recall that n
1
+ n
2
= n and n
1

b
s
2
from inequality (11)), the
above inequality implies that q
a
1
(n  
b
s
1
) > 1=2: By the denition of
b
s
1
we know that
q
b
1
(
b
s
1
)  1=2, but then q
a
1
(n 
b
s
1
) > 1=2 contradicts equation (12).
Now, we complete the proof by showing that (13) holds. Let P
a
(n
0
; k) denote the
probability that, in a society with n
1
voters with p
1
and n
0
voters with p
2
, exactly k of
the voters support a. So in this calculation, the number of voters of type 1 is always
xed, but the number of voters of type 2 is given by n
0
. Writing in the expressions for
q
a
2
from Bayes' rule, we need to show that
1
k
 
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
2
  1; k   1)
p
2
P
a
(n
2
  1; k) + (1  p
2
)P
a
(n
2
  1; k   1)
!
>
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1k + 1
 
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
2
  1; k)
p
2
P
a
(n
2
  1; k + 1) + (1  p
2
)P
a
(n
2
  1; k)
!
: (14)
Note that
P
a
(n
0
; k) = p
2
P
a
(n
0
  1; k) + (1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1): (15)
So substituting from (15) and simplifying, we rewrite (14) as
(k + 1)
P
a
(n
2
  1; k   1)
P
a
(n
2
; k)
> k
P
a
(n
2
  1; k)
P
a
(n
2
; k + 1)
: (16)
We show this by induction on n
2
. A straightforward (but tedious) expansion of the
expressions (that we leave to the reader) veries that ( 16) holds for n
2
= 1 and any
k  1 (set
P
a
(n
2
;k)
P
a
(n
2
;k+1)
= 0=0 = 1 when k > n
1
+ n
2
). We now show that if (16) holds for
each n
2
< n
0
and k  1, then it holds for n
0
and any k  1. Rewriting (16) at n
0
and
expanding using ( 15) in each expression we obtain,
(k + 1)

p
2
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1) + p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k)
+p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1) + (1  p
2
)
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  1; k)

> k

p
2
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  1; k) + p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1)
+p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k) + (1  p
2
)
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1)

Using the induction hypothesis, we eliminate the rst expression on each side of the
inequality, and then collecting terms and simplifying we obtain
p
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k) + (k + 1)p
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1)
+(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  1; k)
> kp
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1) + (1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1)
Now, substituting for P
a
(n
0
  1; ) from (15), we rewrite the above as
p
2
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k) + p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)
+p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  2; k) + (1  p
2
)
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)
+(k+1)p
2
2
P
a
(n
0
 2; k 2)P
a
(n
0
 2; k+1)+(k+1)p
2
(1 p
2
)P
a
(n
0
 2; k 2)P
a
(n
0
 2; k)
> p
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k  1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k  1)+ (1  p
2
)
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k  2)P
a
(n
0
  2; k  1)
+kp
2
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1) + kp
2
(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)
Simplifying, we must only show the inequality
(k+1)p
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k  2)P
a
(n
0
  2; k+ 1)+ (k+1)(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k  2)P
a
(n
0
  2; k)
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> (k   1)p
2
P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1) + (k   1)(1  p
2
)P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)
Using (15) at n
0
  1 we rewrite this as
(k + 1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1) > (k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1): (17)
So we need only show that (17) holds. By the induction hypothesis, we know that
(k + 1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1) > kP
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  1; k);
and
kP
a
(n
0
  2; k   2)P
a
(n
0
  1; k) > (k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1);
or
kP
a
(n
0
  1; k) > (k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1)=P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2):
Combined, these imply that
(k + 1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1)
> P
a
(n
0
  2; k)(k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1)=P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2);
which simplies to
(k + 1)P
a
(n
0
  1; k + 1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k   2) > (k   1)P
a
(n
0
  2; k)P
a
(n
0
  1; k   1):
This veries that (17) holds and completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 11: First, note that given the single-peaked preferences (accounting
for the possibility of two peaks), (s
maj
; S) is self-stable if and only if
jfi : U
i
(s
maj
)  U
i
(s
maj
 1)gj > n S and jfi : U
i
(s
maj
)  U
i
(s
maj
+1)gj > n S: (18)
A suÆcient condition for this is that
jfi : U
i
(s
maj
)  U
i
(s
maj
  1)gj > n  S and jfi : U
i
(s
maj
  1)  U
i
(s
maj
)gj > n  S:
which is in turn guaranteed by
S > jfi : U
i
(s
maj
  1)  U
i
(s
maj
)gj > n  S: (19)
Recall from (2) that
U
i
(s)  U
i
(s  1) = (1  p
i
)P
i
(s  1)  p
i
P
i
(s  2):
Thus,
fi : U
i
(s
maj
  1)  U
i
(s
maj
)g =
(
i :
p
i
1  p
i
= z
i

P
i
(s
maj
  1)
P
i
(s
maj
  2)
)
: (20)
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From the denition of P
i
(s) it follows that
P
i
(s)
P
i
(s  1)
=
P
CNni;jCj=s
[
j2C
p
j

j =2C
(1  p
j
)]
P
CNni;jCj=s 1
[
j2C
p
j

j =2C
(1  p
j
)]
Dividing top and bottom by 
j 6=i
(1  p
j
), this becomes
P
i
(s)
P
i
(s  1)
=
P
CNni;jCj=s

j2C
z
j
P
CNni;jCj=s 1

j2C
z
j
So, by the above equation and (20), we can rewrite (19) as
S > jfi : z
i

P
CNni;jCj=
n
2

j2C
z
j
P
CNni;jCj=
n
2
 1

j2C
z
j
gj > n  S: (21)
This can be rewritten as
S > jfi :
X
CN;i2C;jCj=
n
2

j2C
z
j

X
CNni;jCj=
n
2

j2C
z
j
gj > n  S;
which is the claimed expression.
A direct rewriting of (21) leads to the claimed expression in (4):
S > jfi : z
i

X
k 6=i

i
k
z
k
gj > n  S;
where

i
k
=
2
n
P
jCj=
n
2
 1;i;k =2C
(
j2C
z
j
)
P
jCj=
n
2
 1;i=2C
(
j2C
z
j
)
:
Direct inspection shows that
P
k 6=i

i
k
= 1 for all i.
Proof of Vote Trading Claim: Given that p
i
2 (0; 1) for each i, every C has a positive
probability of being realized. For each C let 
C
denote the probability that C is realized.
Let p = min
C

C
.
If s is not the simple majority rule, identify the set of C's where a minority ends up
having their alternative chosen. Let M denote this set of C's.
For each C 2M , select p
C
> 0 so that the product p
C

C
is the same across all C's in
M , and set p
C
= 0 for any C =2M . This vote trading scheme upsets s. To see this, note
that M is a symmetric set as it will be all C's of sizes that fall below s and are at least
n+1
2
(or above s and no more than
n+1
2
if s is smaller than
n+1
2
). Given this symmetry
and the fact that for each of these C's, we have #C 6= #N nC, it follows that there are
more of these sets C for which any xed voter i is in the majority than in the minority.
By the choice of probabilities, the probabilities of vote trading are the same across all
C 2 M and so any voter i expects to benet since they are more often in the majority
than the minority.
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